The Dubins–Spanier optimization problem in fair division theory  by Dall'Aglio, Marco
Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics 130 (2001) 17–40
www.elsevier.nl/locate/cam
The Dubins–Spanier optimization problem in fair
division theory
Marco Dall’Aglio∗
Viale Pindaro, 42, 65127, Dipartimento di Scienze, Universita “G. d’Annunzio”, Pescara, Italy
Received 10 August 1998; received in revised form 8 November 1999
Abstract
An optimality criterion for fair division theory, introduced by Dubins and Spanier in 1961, is recalled with the purpose
of analyzing its structure in relationship with other optimal solutions (Pareto- and equi-optimal partitions). A geometric
dual approach is also de4ned, with the purpose of characterizing and identifying the Dubins–Spanier optimal solutions.
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1. Introduction
In the last few years fair division theory ( f.d.t.) is drawing an attention comparable to (or even
greater than) that received during the decade 1950–60 when the theory was 4rst formulated and two
directions of research were pursued: (i) the study of the range of a vector of probability measures,
by Lyapunov [16] (extended by authors such as Halmos [8], Dvoretzky et al. [6], Blackwell [2] and
Karlin [12]); (ii) a formal analysis of the most widely used methods to divide goods between two
or more persons, by Steinhaus [19,20] (also Banach and Knaster contributed to these 4rst steps).
The two streams of research merged in a paper by Dubins and Spanier [5]. In fact, what appears,
at 4rst glance, only as a clear review of the state of art on fair division theory at time of publication,
actually introduces innovative ideas on both theoretic and algorithmic issues. Just as importantly, two
concepts of optimality are introduced, the most important of this considers the lexicographic order
of the amounts received by the dividers and will be referred to as DS-optimality. The Lyapunov
theorem is exploited in this context to show the existence of such optimal solutions. Dubins and
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Spanier also introduce several important tools such as, for instance, the density functions in place
of probability measures.
The idea of treating fair division as a proper optimization problem seems forgotten for a long
time after Dubins and Spanier’s work. In fact the interest to optimization in fair division is revived
two decades later, by the review paper of Kirman [13]. Later on, Weller [22] considers a diFerent
criterion of optimality which combines Pareto optimality and envy freeness. In the very last part of
that paper, a comparison between this de4nition and DS-optimality is brieGy sketched. In particular it
is shown that a DS-optimal partition is also Pareto optimal, but it is much stricter than the latter. This
work is also important because it provides a constructive method to obtain Pareto partitions. More
recently, Akin [1] provides a natural setting for a probabilistic treatment of the topics investigated
by Weller. In this context, several extensions of Weller’s results are made possible. In particular,
Akin [1] shows a more precise characterization of Pareto optimal partitions which represents a very
important starting point for the present work.
In the last decade, three authors helped to revive the interest on fair division with their remark-
able production. Hill (alone or with several co-authors) extended the fair division theory in many
directions ranging from the extension to the case where the measures have atoms 1 to the sharpening
of bounds for fairness and super-fairness inequalities. He also set up several applications for fair
division theory, including statistics and optimal stopping theory. We refer to [10,11] for a review of
these topics and other important results. Brams and Taylor (and co-authors) stressed the importance
of procedures to make fair division applicable to a great variety of applications within social sciences.
Their earlier achievement are collected in a book [4] which constitutes an exhaustive introduction
to fair division from a procedural point of view. The “ancestors” of these methods are the “cut and
choose” rule and the “sliding knife” procedure expressed by Banach and Knaster and in a more
general form by Dubins and Spanier [5] in the very important paper already mentioned.
Other authors have contributed to the construction of a solid theory for fair division (see, for
example, [3,18,21,23]). The authors previously cited represent, however, the most important inGu-
ences and background for the present work.
A general trend which emerges from this short review is a clear cut distinction between theoretic
and procedural results. This is mainly due to the fact that most of the basic tools for fair division
are nonconstructive, so they are of no great help in 4nding the optimal solutions, whose existence
is guaranteed by those very results.
In the present work, we recall the results of Dubins and Spanier concerning an optimization
problem in f.d.t. with two main purposes: (i) to study the structure of the Dubins–Spanier (DS-)
optimal solution in relationship with other criteria of optimality (Pareto- and equi-optimality) and
(ii) to de4ne a dual optimization problem with a simpler structure that allows to compute the
DS-solution by minimizing convex functions over a 4nite dimensional simplex. The procedure is
quite general and, in principle, it works for any number of participants involved in the division.
We consider a formulation of the problem which diFers slightly from the Dubins–Spanier original
in the fact that allocations are considered in place of partitions. All stated results, however, apply to
the original problem when player’s preferences are speci4ed through nonatomic probability measures,
by virtue of the Lyapunov Theorem (see Theorem 3.1).
1 These evidently cause problems when it comes to partition of goods — more technically, several tools such as the
Lyapunov theorem may not work in this case.
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Section 2 deals with the basic de4nitions of f.d.t. and the statement of the Dubins–Spanier opti-
mization problem. A related problem that deals with equitable divisions, namely allocations that yield
the same value of satisfaction for each person, is also speci4ed. Section 3 introduces the allocation
range, namely the set of evaluations made by the players for all possible allocations of the cake.
Section 4 gives a characterization of Pareto-optimal allocations, based on the geometrical setting of
the previous section. Section 5 describes how to plot the DS-optimal solution on the allocation range
and examines the structure of the optimal allocation. SuLcient conditions are also given under which
a DS-solution is equitable. Section 6 describes a dual approach that provides an algorithm for the
actual computation of the DS-optimal solution and, 4nally, some applications related to examples
already mentioned in the f.d.t. literature are shown in Section 7.
2. Preliminary denitions
The problem of fair division may be simply stated as follows (see [11]). For a 4xed integer d, let
J1 = {1; : : : ; d} and let {j}j∈J1 be a set of d probability measures de4ned on the same measurable
space (;F). All measures are absolutely continuous w.r.t. the measure =(
∑
j j)=d on (;F). Let
{fj}j∈J1 be the corresponding density functions w.r.t. . Consider the class  of all F-measurable
partitions of  composed exactly by d sets, i.e. P ∈  if P = (Aj)j∈J1 ;
⋃
j∈J1 Aj = ; Ai ∩ Aj = ∅
for i = j and Aj ∈F for all j ∈ J1. From the collection  a single partition is chosen that satis4es
some objective.
In [11], a cake-cutting or fair-division explanation given: “ is a cake which must be divided
among d people having values 1; : : : ; d (that is, j(A) is the relative value of piece [ · · · ] A to
person j [also denoted as player, or agent]), and  describes the permissible divisions”.
This interpretation is naturally linked to some aspects of game theory in terms of the strategy
adopted by each person involved in the division. This topic, however, will not be discussed here.
We consider a natural generalization of a partition which allows each point x ∈  to be splitted
among several agents. To this aim we de4ne the allocation function  = (j)j∈J1 , a vector of d
measurable nonnegative functions on  such that
∑
j∈J1 j(x) = 1 for every x ∈ . The function
j(x) represents the “amount of point x” given to the agent j. The total value of the piece of cake
received by the same agent is∫

jfj d: (1)
The idea of allocation can be traced back to the important work [6] where it is given the name of
probability vector. We denote with  the class of all measurable allocations. This of course includes
 whenever p = (p1 ; : : : ; 
p
d) is such that 
p
j (x) ∈ {0; 1} ∀j ∀x (this is called a pure vector in the
notation of the original reference [6]). Denote the smaller class by p. The use of allocations and
partitions is often equivalent, as it will be made more precise in Proposition 3:1.
A “good” allocation  ∈  should verify certain properties. First of all it should be fair in the
sense that∫

jfj d¿
1
d
∀j ∈ J1:
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The allocation becomes super-fair when all the above inequalities are strict. Also an allocation 
should be Pareto optimal in the sense that there is no other allocation ˜ ∈  that dominates .
More formally,∫

˜jfj d¿
∫

jfj d ∀j ∈ J1 ⇒
∫

˜jfj d=
∫

jfj d ∀j ∈ J1: (2)
Other favourable properties for a partition can be found in [11]. The mentioned properties specify a
rather large class of allocations. Instead, we would like to focus on more strict criteria of optimality
that single out an allocation which is unique in terms of the values (1) received by the agents.
Dubins and Spanier in [5] de4ne two optimization problems in the cake-cutting context. The
second of them is the most important (in their own words), and it deals with the lexicographic
order of the amounts given to the agents. The following formulation of the problem diFers from the
original formulation only in the fact that partitions are replaced by allocations. For each allocation
 ∈ , arrange the numbers (1) in non-decreasing order and indicate the resulting sequence as
{(1)(); : : : ; (d)()}:
The allocation  is a DS-optimal allocation if, for any allocation ′ ∈, either (i)()=(i)(′) for
all i, or, if j is the smallest i such that (i)() = (i)(′), then ( j)(′)¡( j)().
An optimal partition can be found with an iterative procedure. First of all we solve
∗(1) = sup{(1)():  ∈ }; (3)
then, for given ∗(1); : : : ; 
∗
(t), 16t6d− 1, we look for
∗(t+1) = sup{(t+1)():  ∈ ; ( j)() = ∗( j); j = 1; : : : ; t}: (4)
It is straightforward to verify that this procedure at step d yields a DS-optimal procedure (provided
it exists).
In the same work, Dubins and Spanier de4ne the notion of equitable allocation, i.e., an allocation
 ∈  that veri4es∫

ifi d =
∫

jfj d ∀i; j ∈ J1: (5)
In the mentioned paper [5] a result about existence of optimal partitions is given. This conclusion
is based on a theorem by Lyapunov [16] on the compactness of the range of a vector of probability
measures. Lyapunov’s Theorem (which also includes the convexity property of the range — valid
only for nonatomic measures) is fundamental to many results in fair division theory.
Another result states suitable conditions under which a DS-optimal partition is also equitable. The
paper [5], however, does not give a constructive way of 4nding an optimal partition. One of the
goals of the present work is to outline a constructive procedure to solve (3) and (4).
Another optimization problem tightly linked to the one introduced by Dubins and Spanier [5] is the
following. Take an equitable allocation  and denote the common value in (5) as y(). Then look
for the maximal equitable allocation, denoted equi-optimal allocation with values y∗1 = (y
∗
1 ; : : : ; y
∗
1 )
M. Dall’Aglio / Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics 130 (2001) 17–40 21
where
y∗1 = sup{y():  equitable}: (6)
A straightforward relationship can be established between the two optimal values.
Proposition 2.1. There always exists a DS-optimal solution ∗={∗(1); : : : ; ∗(d)} and an equi-optimal
solution y∗1 = (y
∗
1 ; : : : ; y
∗
1 ). Moreover
y∗16
∗ with y∗1 = 
∗
(1):
Proof. The existence of both solutions derives from the Lyapunov theorem and will be stated as
part (i) of Proposition 3:1. Moreover, by de4nition, we must have y∗16
∗
(1) and therefore the vector
inequality y∗16
∗ holds. Last equation will be proved as Corollary 5.4.
Therefore the two optimization problem can be seen as two sides of the same minimax optimization
problem. For the equi-optimal solution, once the optimal value ∗(1) in (3) is found all agents are
given the same value of the cake. For a DS-optimal solution, we 4rst determine the solution ∗(1) and
then we look for an allocation which is the best possible for the other agents in the sense speci4ed
by (4).
3. The allocation range
In this section we describe a geometrical structure that could help in 4nding the solution for the
Dubins–Spanier optimization problem ((3) and (4)) and for the related problem (6).
For economy of notation we write, for every  ∈ ,
E() =
(∫

jfj d
)
j∈J1
∈ Rd:
Consider now the subset of Rd determined by all possible values of E() and call it the allocation
range of 1; : : : ; d
C = {E():  ∈ }:
Similarly, the partition range of 1; : : : ; d
Cp = {E(p): p ∈ p}:
will denote the set of values spanned by all possible partitions. The partition range has been explicitly
employed in f.d.t. by Hill [9] and Legut [14]. The study of several important properties of C and Cp
dates back to 1951 with Dvoretzky et al. [6]. In fact, these authors consider the richer environment
composed by all matrices (
∫
 ifj d), with i; j ∈ J1, as  ranges in . The following result sums
up Theorems 1, 2, and 4 in [6]. Part (i) is a version of the famous theorem by Lyapunov in [16],
while part (iii) shows that when all j are nonatomic, the use of allocations is just equivalent to the
use of partitions.
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Theorem 3.1.
(i) C is a compact and convex set of Rd:
(ii) All extreme points of C are in Cp; so
C = convCp;
where conv denotes the convex hull.
(iii) If 1; : : : ; d are nonatomic; then C = Cp.
The set of Pareto optimal allocations lies on the “upper surface” UC of C de4ned as
UC = @C ∩

x ∈ Rd:
∑
j∈J1
xj¿1

 : (7)
Let 1 be the d-dimensional simplex, i.e.
1 =

u ∈ R d+ :
∑
j∈J1
uj = 1

 ;
and let Q1 be its interior. The allocation range looks like an “inGated” d-dimensional simplex. In
fact the following inclusion holds:
1⊂C: (8)
To prove (8), 4x u ∈ 1 and consider the allocation j ≡ uj ∀j to have∫

jfj d= uj
and therefore u ∈ C. To investigate other interesting properties of C and, in particular, its symmetry
we refer to Proposition 2:3 in [9].
4. Pareto allocations on the allocation range
We now aim at characterizing the Pareto optimal allocations. In doing so we are also going to
set up a framework for the search of DS- and equi-optimal partitions. We begin with some iterative
de4nitions.
First of all, for a given set of indexes, Jt ⊂ J1, t denotes the “marginal” simplex on Jt , i.e.,
t =

(uj)j∈Jt : uj¿0;
∑
j∈Jt
uj = 1

 :
Take now u1 = (u1j)j∈J1 ∈1. Denote with J2⊂ J1 the indexes (if any) corresponding to null
components in u1. Fix u2 = (u2j)j∈J2 ∈2 and let J3 be its null components. Continue iteratively up
to some ur ∈r , r¿d, whose components are all positive. For convenience of notation, it is assumed
that Jr+1 = ∅.
Given the sequence u1; : : : ; ur , for any positive integer t; t6r, de4ne
 t(x) =  (x; ut) = max
j∈Jt
utjfj(x):
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Let now F1 =  and
F˜1 = {x ∈ F1:  1(x)¿ 0}; (9)
and continue iteratively for each integer t with 26t6r, by considering
Ft =
t−1⋂
h=1
F˜
c
h; (10)
F˜ t = {x ∈ Ft:  t(x)¿ 0}: (11)
Next, let
F =
r⋃
h=1
F˜h:
It is easy to show that 2
F = {x ∈ : fj(x)¿ 0 for some j ∈ J1}:
Finally, let
K(x) = { j ∈ J1: x ∈ F˜ t and utjfj(x) =  t(x)}: (12)
With u = uu1 ;:::;ur we denote any measurable allocation such that∑
j∈K(x)
uj (x) = 1 ∀x ∈ F: (13)
The following lemmas show that the allocations u play a special role in the search for Pareto
optimal allocations. The next lemma follows closely Theorem 11 in [1].
Lemma 4.1.
(i) For any  ∈  and any integer t; 16t6r;∑
j∈Jt
utjj(x)fj(x)6 t(x); x ∈ Ft a:c:(): (14)
(ii) For any  ∈  and t6r;∑
j∈Jt
utj
∫
Ft
jfj d6
∫
Ft
 t d: (15)
(iii) Let u1; : : : ; ur be given and let Ft and F˜ t (16t6r) be de>ned according to (10) and (11)
respectively. For any integer t the following holds:∑
j∈Jt
utj
∫
Ft
jfj d=
∫
Ft
 t d;
2 F = {x ∈ : fj(x)¿ 0 for some j ∈ J1} can be proved as follows. If x ∈ F , then x ∈ F˜ t for some t and there must
be some index j ∈ Jt \ Jt+1 for which fj(x)¿ 0. Conversely, if x ∈ F , then x ∈ F˜1 and fj(x) = 0, ∀j ∈ J1 \ J2. Then,
proceeding iteratively, for each t6r, x ∈ F˜ t and fj(x) = 0, ∀j ∈ Jt \ Jt+1.
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if and only if∑
j∈K(x)
j(x) = 1; x ∈ F˜ t a:c:(): (16)
Consequently any u satis>es (13) if and only if it attains equality in (15) for any t.
Proof. (i) holds because
∑
j∈Jt
utjjfj(x)6

∑
j∈Jt
j

  t(x)6 t(x); x ∈ Ft a:c(): (17)
Take the integral of both sides over the set Ft to obtain (ii).
The “if ” part in (iii) is immediate when we consider that there are two equal signs in (17) when
u de4ned by (13) is considered. To prove the “only if ” part of the same sentence, assume the
existence of a set D⊂ F˜ t of positive measure  such that∑
j∈K(x)
j(x)¡ 1; x ∈ D:
Then, recalling (17), we have∑
j∈Jt
utjjfj ¡ t(x); x ∈ D;
which, integrated over Ft , yields a contradiction.
The next lemma states that, when allocations (13) are considered, we may always restrict the
integral over a smaller part of .
Lemma 4.2. Suppose u is de>ned by (13) and j ∈ Jt \ Jt+1. Then∫

ujfj d=
∫
F˜ t
ujfj d:
Proof. Since j ∈ Jt , it speci4es a null component in uh; h¡ t and, consequently, j ∈ K(x) for
x ∈ F˜h with h¡ t. Moreover j ∈ Jh for h¿ t, so j ∈ K(x) for x ∈ F˜h with h¿ t. Therefore uj may
assume positive values only on F˜ t .
The previous Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2, together with a separation theorem borrowed from convex
analysis, give us the mathematical tools needed to prove the next result and characterize the Pareto
optimal allocations.
Proposition 4.3. Any allocation u de>ned by (13) is Pareto optimal. Moreover to any Pareto
optimal allocation ˜ we can associate r vectors u1; : : : ; ur ; ut ∈ t ∀t6r; such that ˜ satis>es (13)
for the given vectors; i.e.;
˜= uu1 ;:::;ur :
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Proof. We begin with the second part of the statement. Take a Pareto optimal allocation ˜ and
de4ne z = (zj)j∈J1 as
z = E(˜) ∈ UC:
Since C is closed and convex and z lies on its border, a well-known separation theorem (see, for
example, [17, Theorem 3:2:3]) implies the existence of a vector w1 = (w1j)j∈J1 and a constant b1
such that∑
j∈J1
w1jxj6
∑
j∈J1
w1jzj = b1 ∀x= (xj)j∈J1 ∈ C; (18)
i.e. the hyperplane
H1 =

x:
∑
j∈J1
w1jxj = b1

 (19)
contains z, while C is contained in one of the closed half-spaces determined by H1. A simple
geometric argument shows that we can choose w1¿0 and b1 ¿ 0 with no loss of generality. Thus
the coeLcients in (18) can be normalized as follows:∑
j∈J1
u1jxj6
∑
j∈J1
u1jzj = (1 ∀x= (xj)j∈J1 ∈ C
with u1 = (u1j) ∈ 1. The same inequality can be read in terms of allocations as∑
j∈J1
u1j
∫
F1
jfj d6
∑
j∈J1
u1j
∫
F1
˜jfj d= (1 ∀ ∈ : (20)
Moreover, as a consequence of parts (ii) and (iii) of Lemma 4.1, we have
(1 =
∫
F1
 1 d: (21)
In the case where u1j ¿ 0 ∀j ∈ J1, this is enough to verify our statement. Otherwise the same lemma
and Eqs. (20) and (21) allow us to write∑
j∈K(x)
˜(x) = 1; x ∈ F˜1 a:c:(): (22)
Now consider the set
S2 = {x ∈ Rd: xj = zj ∀j ∈ J1 \ J2}:
S2 is a subspace of Rd with dimension given by the cardinality of J2 (in fact each of its points is
univocally determined by the free coordinates in J2). De4ne
C2 = C ∩S2:
It can be easily veri4ed that C2 is convex and closed in S2 and z lies on the border of C2. Therefore,
the same separation theorem used to obtain (18) can be applied again. So, the hyperplane
H2 =

x= (xj)j∈J2 ∈S2:
∑
j∈J2
w2jxj = b2

 (23)
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touches C2 in z. A suitable normalization then yields u2 = (u2j)j∈J2 ∈2 and (2 such that∑
j∈J2
u2jxj6
∑
j∈J2
u2jzj = (2 ∀x= (xj)j∈J2 ∈ C2: (24)
Since (22) holds with K(x)⊂ J1 \ J2 for x ∈ F˜1, we can conclude that for each j ∈ J2; ˜j takes
positive values only on F2. The same conclusion holds for each  ∈  such that E() ∈ C2 (for
those allocations, (15) holds with the equal sign for t = 1 and we have (16) for t = 1 by part (iii)
of the same lemma).
We can re-write (24) in terms of allocations as follows:∑
j∈J2
u2j
∫
F2
jfj d6
∑
j∈J2
u2j
∫
F2
˜jfj d= (2 ∀ ∈ : (25)
Here, we are considering all the allocations of  instead of the smaller set in C2 because each
 ∈  can be majorized — in terms of the sum in (25) — by an allocation in C2. Similar to the
previous step, we can conclude by Lemma 4.1 that
(2 =
∫
F2
 2 d:
Therefore, by Lemma 4.1 again,∑
j∈K(x)
˜j(x) = 1; x ∈ F˜2 a:c:(); (26)
with K(x)⊂ J2 \ J3. The remaining u’s can be obtained in a similar manner.
Let us now prove the 4rst part of the statement. Suppose that ˆ dominates u, i.e.∫
F1
ˆjfj d¿
∫
F1
ujfj d ∀j ∈ J1: (27)
Parts (ii) and (iii) (the “if ” part) of Lemma 4.1 yield∑
j∈J1
u1j
∫
F1
ˆjfj d=
∑
j∈J1
u1j
∫
F1
ujfj d=
∫
F1
 1 d: (28)
Combining (27) and (28), we obtain∫
F1
ˆjfj d=
∫
F1
ujfj d ∀j ∈ J1 \ J2:
By the “only if ” part of (iii) in Lemma 4.1 applied to (28), we have∑
j∈K(x)
ˆj(x) = 1; x ∈ F˜1 a:c:(): (29)
Now consider a component j in J2. By (29), ˆj takes positive values in F2 and the same holds
for uj by Lemma 4.2. Therefore, (27) restricted to the components in J2 becomes∫
F2
ˆjfj d¿
∫
F2
ujfj d ∀j ∈ J2: (30)
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Apply again parts (ii) and (iii) (the “if ” part) of Lemma 4.1 for t = 2 to have
∑
j∈J2
u2j
∫
F2
ˆjfj d=
∑
j∈J2
u2j
∫
F2
ujfj d=
∫
F2
 2 d; (31)
This, together with (30), yields∫

ˆjfj d=
∫

ujfj d ∀j ∈ J2 \ J3;
and (iii) (“only if ”) of the same lemma yields∑
j∈K(x)
ˆj(x) = 1; x ∈ F˜2 a:c:():
This procedure can be repeated iteratively up to stage r to show that∫

ˆjfj d=
∫

ujfj d;
and therefore u is Pareto optimal.
When 1; : : : ; d are absolutely continuous with respect to each other, then it is easy to show that
F and F1 diFer on a set with null -measure. 3 Therefore, in this case, the vector u1 alone spans all
the Pareto allocations.
The above proof yields shows a method for plotting each Pareto allocation identi4ed by the 4nite
sequence u1; : : : ; ur on the allocation range. First of all, we look for the point on C which intersects
the hyperplane (19) identi4ed by u1, with the highest value for b1. Then, if J2 = ∅, we look for the
point on C2 which meets H2 in (23) with the highest value for b2, and so on, up to step r.
Proposition 4.3 can also be deduced from the results of Akin [1]. We refer, in particular, to
Theorem 11, Corollary 12, Theorem 13 and a description of the iterative process, lines 8–18 of
p. 40 in [1]. Here, however, we are interested in localizing the Pareto allocations on the allocation
range C. This will allow the plotting of DS-optimal solution on the same set (see Section 5) and
the development of suitable algorithms for this search (see Section 6). Therefore, a new proof of
Proposition 4.3, entirely based on geometrical arguments, is presented here.
An open question pertains the unicity of the allocation values identi4ed by a given set of simplex
vectors since those vectors and (13) may generate diFerent points on the surface of C.
5. Optimal solutions on the allocation range
The geometrical setting introduced in the previous section allows us to give a visual representation
for the DS- and equi-optimal values. As it will be made clearer in the next section, this framework
3 Since the j are absolutely continuous w.r.t each other, the sets {x ∈ : fi(x)¿ 0}; i = 1; : : : ; d diFer at most of a
set of -measure zero. Therefore F1 = F; a:c:().
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also yields a natural environment for the construction of algorithms that 4nd those solutions. It has
already been proved that y∗16
∗. The next example shows that the two values may diFer, even in
a very simple situation.
Example. Take  = [0; 2] and consider 1; 2 and 3 uniform distributions on [0,1], [0.9,1.3] and
[1,2] respectively. Clearly, 1 has no competitors on [0, 0.9), and the same is true for 3 on (1.3, 2].
Moreover, 2 shares 3=4 of its mass with 3 only, while the rest is shared with 1. Thus, most of
the competition is played between 2 and 3. In fact, it is easy to show that the equi-optimal
solution 4 has value y∗1 = (0:7857; 0:7857; 0:7857) and it is achieved, for instance, by attributing
B1 = [0; 0:7857]; B2 = [0:9; 1:2143) and B3 = [1:2143; 2] respectively to 1; 2 and 3. Evidently,
the whole interval [0, 0.9) can be given to 1 without diminishing the other agents’ share and the
DS-optimal value is ∗ = (0:9; 0:7857; 0:7857).
This example anticipates several facts that are now going to be proved. 5 In 4rst place, the example
shows a situation where only ∗ deserves the property of Pareto optimality. In fact the following
holds.
Proposition 5.1. A DS-optimal solution is Pareto optimal.
Proof. Suppose  ∈  is such that E()=∗=(∗1 ; : : : ; ∗d)={∗(1); : : : ; ∗(d)} and there exists another
allocation ˜ ∈  whose value E(˜) = (x1; : : : ; xd) = {x(1); : : : ; x(d)} dominates , i.e., xj¿∗j ∀j.
4 The simple argument used to 4nd the equi-optimal solution is the following: Player 1 has 0.9 for his=her own.
Player 3 has 0.7. Players 2 and 3 cannot have both 0.9 value. So the cutting point between player 2 and 3 is the solution
of the following equation:
2:5(x − 0:9) = 2− x:
Slices [0:9; x) and [x; 2] are given to players 2 and 3, respectively. The solution is
x = 4:25=3:5 ≈ 1:214:
So player 2 receives the value
2:5(1:214− 0:9) = 0:7857
while player 3 receives
2− 1:214 = 0:7857:
To obtain the equi-optimal value we give, for instance, slice [0; 0:7857] to player 1. To obtain the DS-optimal solution,
we give him=her the whole interval [0; 0:9).
5 We could also use the following simpler example.
Example. Let  = [0; 1] and let 1; 2; 3 be the uniform distributions on [0, 1], [0, 1] and [1, 2] respectively. The
measure 3 has no competitors on its support, so the third participant can receive any value between 0 and 1 without
aFecting the shares given to players 1 and 2. Conversely, the 4rst two players compete on [0; 1] and they consider each
point of the interval equally valuable. Evidently, the equi-optimal value is (0.5, 0.5, 0.5) and the DS-optimal solution has
value (0.5, 0.5, 1).
We prefer the example actually shown in the paper. It is more complicated, but it is more interesting, because the
three measures have diFerent support.
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Suppose now that j1 identi4es the smallest coordinate in E(˜), i.e., xj1 = x(1). Now the following
chain holds:
x(1) = xj1¿
∗
j1¿
∗
(1): (32)
Since ∗ is DS-optimal, x(1)6∗(1) must hold, and thus (32) implies xj1 = 
∗
j1 .
The procedure can be repeated iteratively. Suppose that for h with 26h6t − 1, the index jh is
such that xjh = x(h) and the equation xjh = 
∗
jh has been veri4ed. Since ˜ dominates , we have
x(t) = xjt¿
∗
jt¿
∗
(t):
Also x(t)6∗(t), by de4nition of DS-optimality, so xjt = 
∗
jt . Therefore, E() =E(˜) and thus  must
be Pareto optimal.
Next, we identify the optimal solutions on the allocation range C. The easier task is to 4nd the
value of the equi-optimal solution. First of all, we draw the set of equal risk allocations B1, which
coincides with the bisector of the positive quadrant
B1 = {x ∈ Rd: xi = xj; i; j ∈ J1}:
Evidently, the equi-optimal solution has value y∗1 = (y˜ 1; : : : ; y˜ 1) where y˜ 1 is given by
y˜ 1 = sup{y: (y; : : : ; y) ∈ B1 ∩ C}: (33)
The set in question is not empty for it surely contains, by (8), the point (1=d; : : : ; 1=d) of 1. The
following result gives a better visualization of the equi-optimal value.
Proposition 5.2. The equi-optimal value y∗1 satis>es
B1 ∩UC = {y∗1}:
Proof. y∗1 lies on the upper surface UC, otherwise we could 4nd another solution yˆ on B1 which
dominates y∗1 . To show that this is the only point in the intersection, suppose that w ∈ B1 ∩ UC
with w¡ y∗1 . Then w is contained in the interior of the polytope formed by y
∗
1 and the orthonormal
basis {ej} of Rd. This, in turn, is contained in C by convexity and the contradiction is clear.
Some more eFort is needed in order to represent the value of a DS-optimal allocation on C. The
tools needed to achieve this aim resemble those used in Proposition 4.3. In particular, the following
iterative de4nitions are needed.
First of all, since y∗1 ∈ UC, there is a hyperplane H˜1 supporting C in y∗1 identi4ed by u˜1 ∈ 1
and the equation∑
j∈J1
u1jxj = y˜ 1: (34)
The constant term is explained by the fact that y∗1 ∈ H˜1.
In order to obtain the DS-optimal value, we can proceed iteratively to de4ne a 4nite sequence
of vectors in the zonoid y∗1 ; : : : ; y
∗
r and simplex vectors u˜1; : : : ; u˜r . The procedure that generates y
∗
t+1
and u˜t+1 from y∗t and u˜t is the following. The null components in u˜t are grouped in Jt+1 and we
consider the subspace S˜t+1 with free coordinates in Jt+1
S˜t+1 = {x ∈ Rd: xj = y∗tj ∀j ∈ J1 \ Jt+1}; (35)
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and the subset of the zonoid
C˜t+1 = C ∩ S˜t+1: (36)
The set of equal valued allocations in S˜t+1 is given by
Bt+1 = {x ∈ S˜t+1: xi = xj i; j ∈ Jt+1}: (37)
We then select the maximum value of an allocation on this set
y˜ t+1 = sup{y ∈ R : ∃x ∈ Bt+1 ∩ C˜t+1; xj = y ∀j ∈ Jt+1}; (38)
and de4ne the vector y∗t+1 ∈ C with components
y∗t+1; j =
{
y∗tj for j ∈ J1 \ Jt+1;
y˜ t+1 J ∈ Jt+1: (39)
Now y∗t+1 belongs to the upper surface of C˜t+1. So there exists a hyperplane in S˜t+1 identi4ed by a
vector u˜t+1 ∈ t+1,
H˜t+1 =

x ∈ S˜t+1:
∑
j∈Jt+1
u˜ t+1; jxj = y˜ t+1

 ; (40)
which supports C˜t+1 in y∗t+1.
The procedure ends at some stage r when the simplex vector u˜r contains only positive components.
The vector y∗r and the 4nite sequence u˜1; : : : ; u˜r yield a satisfactory characterization of a DS-optimal
allocation and its value.
Proposition 5.3.
(i) y∗r is the DS-optimal value; i.e.;
y∗r = 
∗: (41)
Moreover; if
|Jt \ Jt+1|= qt; t = 1; : : : ; r
with Jr+1 = ∅ and ∑t qt = d; then
∗(1) = · · ·= ∗(q1) = y˜ 1 (42)
and; for each h; 26h6r;
∗(q1+···+qh−1+1) = · · ·= ∗(q1+···+qh) = y˜ h: (43)
(ii) There exists an allocation DS which satis>es (13) with simplex vectors u˜1; : : : ; u˜r and such
that
E(DS) = ∗: (44)
Proof. (i) By Proposition 2.1, ∗ dominates y∗1 , i.e.,
∗j¿y
∗
1j ∀j ∈ J1: (45)
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Now the hyperplane H˜1 supports C in y∗1 , so∑
j∈J1
u˜ 1j∗j6y˜ 1: (46)
Joining together (45) and (46) and recalling the de4nition of y∗1 we conclude that
∗j = y˜ 1 ∀j ∈ J1 \ J2;
∗j¿y˜ 1 ∀j ∈ J2:
(47)
Therefore, if |J1 \ J2|= q1, Eq. (42) is satis4ed.
Now continue inductively and suppose that (43) holds for every h6t. These equations bring two
straightforward consequences:
∗j¿y
∗
t+1; j ; ∀j ∈ Jt+1; (48)
∗ ∈ C˜t+1: (49)
It follows that, since |Jt+1 \ Jt+2|= qt+1,
∗(q1+···+qt+1) = · · ·= ∗(q1+···+qt+1) = y˜ t+1:
The proof of (ii) is in essence a repetition of the second part of Proposition 4.3. Simply replace
z and u1; : : : ; ur in that proof with y∗r and u˜1; : : : ; u˜r respectively. Note also that, for any given t6r,
a hyperplane H˜t that supports C˜t in y∗t , supports the same set also in y
∗
r .
This proposition has two direct consequences.
Corollary 5.4. The following always holds:
∗(1) = y˜ 1
and; therefore; y∗1 = 
∗
1 .
Corollary 5.5. If u˜1 ∈ Q1 then y∗1 = ∗.
The suLcient condition set in the last corollary is hard to be veri4ed practically. So we look for
suLcient conditions which are easier to check. The following proposition pursues this goal.
Proposition 5.6. Suppose that; for some u=(uj)j∈J1 ∈ 1; the hyperplane H={x ∈ Rd:
∑
j∈J1 ujxj
= (} supports C in y∗1 . If; moreover; uj =0 ∀j ∈ J2; |J2|= q; then for every allocation  such that
E() = y∗1 ; we have∫

jfj d¿
1
d− q ∀j ∈ J1;∫

hfj d= 0 ∀j ∈ J1 \ J2 ∀h ∈ J2:
(50)
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Proof. Since u ∈ 1 and y∗1 ∈ H, we must conclude that y∗1 = ((; : : : ; (). By hypothesis, H is
parallel to the axes indexed by J2. This means that all points in the segment joining y∗1 and C=(vj),
de4ned as
vj =
{
( if j ∈ J1 \ J2;
0 if j ∈ J2;
lie on the upper surface UC. Since 1⊂C by (8), we must conclude that (¿1=(d− q). Moreover,
since y∗1 ∈ UC, there exists an allocation  such that E()= y∗1 and (50) holds. In fact, arguing by
contradiction, suppose that for each allocation  such that E()=y∗1 there exist h ∈ J2 and i ∈ J1\J2
for which∫

hfi d= c¿ 0:
Now consider the allocation
˜j =


h=2 if j = h;
i + h=2 if j = i;
j otherwise:
This allocation plots the following point C˜= (v˜j) in C
v˜j =


(=2 if j = h;
( + c=2 if j = i;
( otherwise;
thus contradicting the hypothesis that H supports C.
Some simple hypothesis may be formulated in order to avoid the situation shown in the previous
lemma. These conditions, however, are far from being necessary.
Corollary 5.7. If there exists a measurable set D such that
fj(x)¿ 0 ∀x ∈ D ∀j ∈ J1;
and
j(D)¿
d− 2
d− 1 ∀j ∈ J1; (51)
then the hyperplane H is such that u ∈ Q1 and ∗ = y∗1 .
Proof. Suppose that u ∈ Q1, then uj = 0 ∀j ∈ J2 with |J2|= q. An allocation  such that E() = y∗1
is the one ful4lling∑
j∈K(x)
j(x) = 1; x ∈ F˜1 a:c:():
By de4nition, h ∈ K(x) for h ∈ J2 and x ∈ F˜1. Thus h(x) = 0 for x ∈ F˜1. Since D⊂ F˜1, we must
conclude, for any j ∈ J1∫

jfj d=
∫
Dc
hfh d6h(Dc)¡ 1− d− 2d− 1 =
1
d− 1 ;
which clearly contradicts the statement of Proposition 5.6.
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Corollary 5.8. If all the measures j are absolutely continuous with respect to each other; then
∗ = y∗1 .
Proof. In this case the set D of the previous corollary is such that j(D) = 1; ∀j ∈ J1.
Remark. This explains the last few lines in [5]: “In the event that the measures j are not only
non-atomic but also each is absolutely continuous with respect to every other, then every optimal
partition is equitable. Even in the non-atomic case the converse does not hold”.
6. How to cut the cake
We now focus on a constructive method that 4nds optimal allocations for both problems. The
idea is to look for a DS-optimal allocation and then to derive an equi-optimal one. In many cases
this last step takes no eFort since the two values may coincide. This happens, for instance, under
the hypotheses of Corollaries 5.7 and 5.8.
The main tool to achieve this procedure is to consider some sort of “dual” problem which is
easier to solve, since it involves the minimization of convex functions over bounded sets. This is
a great improvement over the original problem which considers an optimization over the space of
allocations.
Much of the work in this direction has already been illustrated in the previous sections: a
DS-optimal allocation is Pareto optimal and it is completely speci4ed by a 4nite set of simplex
vectors u˜1; : : : ; u˜r de4ned before Proposition 5.3. The algorithm we are going to propose set those
vectors in a framework where they are optimal solutions of minimization problems.
The DS algorithm
Step 1 • De4ne g1 : 1 → [0; 1] as
g1(u1) =
∫
F1
 (·; u1) d (52)
• choose uˆ1 ∈ 1 so that
uˆ1 ∈ argmin
u1∈1
g1(u1) (53)
• If J2 = { j: uˆ 1j = 0} = ∅ go to the 4nal step, otherwise proceed with step 2.
Step t + 1 given uˆ1; : : : ; uˆt and Jt+1 = { j: uˆ tj = 0}= ∅
• De4ne Ft+1 as in (10)
• De4ne gt+1 : t+1 → [0; 1] as
gt+1(ut+1) =
∫
Ft+1
 (·; ut+1) d (54)
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• choose uˆt+1 ∈ t+1 so that
uˆt+1 ∈ argmin
ut+1∈t+1
gt+1(ut+1) (55)
• If Jt+2 = { j: uˆ t+1; j = 0} = ∅ go to the 4nal step, otherwise proceed with step t + 2.
Final step (step r) Find an allocation which satis4es (13) for the given vectors uˆ1; : : : ; uˆr .
Following is a proof of the eFectiveness of the DS algorithm.
Proposition 6.1.
(i) For each t6r; the set argmin gt is not empty.
(ii) Suppose uˆ1; : : : ; uˆr are given by the DS Algorithm. Then; there exists an allocation DS deter-
mined as in (13) by these vectors which is DS-optimal.
Proof. In view of the de4nitions of the previous section, and in particular of Proposition 5.3, we
only need to show that, for each t6r, any minimizing argument for gt identi4es a hyperplane H˜t
which supports C˜t in y∗t . This fact and the supporting hyperplane theorem guarantee on one side
that there always exists a minimizing argument for gt . On the other hand, Proposition 5.3 makes
sure that (ii) holds.
Beginning with step 1, for any u1 ∈ 1, the hyperplane H1 in Rd determined by the equation∑
j∈J1
u1jxj = g1(u1) (56)
supports C at some point achieved by any allocation satisfying (16) for t = 1. Moreover, this
hyperplane meets the bisector B1 at the point
g1 = (g1(u1); : : : ; g1(u1)):
Since y∗1 ∈ C ∩ B1 and g1 ∈H1 ∩ B1, it must follow that
g1(u1)¿y˜ 1 ∀u1 ∈ 1: (57)
Here strict equality is reached only by those simplex vectors whose hyperplane H1 supports C in
y∗1 . The vector uˆ1 is among those candidates by de4nition (53).
Continuing iteratively, suppose that y∗t and uˆ1; : : : ; uˆt are given with Jt+1 = ∅. De4ne S˜t+1; C˜t+1
and Bt+1 as in (35), (36) and (37), respectively. For any ut+1 ∈ t+1 consider the hyperplane Ht+1
in S˜t+1 de4ned by the equation∑
j∈Jt+1
ut+1; jxj = gt+1(ut+1): (58)
Similar to Step 1, Ht+1 supports C˜t+1 at some point achieved by any allocation which satis4es
(16) with t replaced by t+1 and such that
∫
 jfj d=y
∗
tj for j ∈ J1\Jt+1. Moreover, the hyperplane
meets the bisector Bt+1 at the point
gt+1 =
{
y∗tj j ∈ J1 \ Jt+1;
gt+1(ut+1) j ∈ Jt+1:
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Since y∗t+1 ∈ C˜t+1 ∩ Bt+1 and gt+1 ∈Ht+1 ∩ Bt+1 hold simultaneously, the following is satis4ed:
gt+1(ut+1)¿y˜ t+1 ∀ut+1 ∈ t+1: (59)
Once again, strict equality is achieved only by those vectors whose hyperplane (58) supports C˜t+1
in y∗t+1. Our choice uˆt+1 is among these by property (55).
The search for optimality in (53) and (55) is made easier by the convexity property that each gt
shares. This is shown below.
Proposition 6.2. For every t, the function gt is convex.
Proof. For any 4nite collection Jt ⊂ J1; take u; C ∈ t and - ∈ [0; 1]. Trivially -u + (1 − -)C ∈ t
and from
max
j∈Jt
[(-uj + (1− -)vj)fj(x)]6- max
j∈Jt
ujfj(x) + (1− -) max
j∈Jt
vjfj(x)
we get, taking integrals of both sides over Ft ,
gt(-u + (1− -)C)6-gt(u) + (1− -)gt(C):
The idea of duality is not entirely new in f.d.t. To our knowledge, the 4rst authors to make
explicit use of duality are Elton et al. [7], who 4nd the optimal value of ∗(1). Legut and WilczyTnsky
[15] 4nd the explicit solution for an allocation that reaches ∗(1). This is, essentially, step 1 of the
algorithm shown here. The original problem de4ned by Dubins and Spanier [5] and the procedure
contained in the DS algorithm share an apparent relationship of strong mutual duality: the former
is a maximization problem while the latter deals with minimizing convex functions. Both problems
admit optimal solutions and in view of the equality
min
ut∈t
gt(ut) = y˜ t ; t = 1; : : : ; r;
we can aLrm that the two optimal values always coincide. An open question concerns the design
of a proper formal duality framework where to con4gure the two problems in a uni4ed approach.
We have not yet given any consideration on how to obtain an equi-optimal allocation from the
DS-optimal one when the corresponding values do not coincide. The main guideline is to re-allocate
part of the “cake” given to agents, whose share exceeds the equi-optimal value, to other agents who
already have attained the optimal value and give null worth to the part received. This rule will be
illustrated in Example 7.2.
7. Examples
Two applications of the algorithm described in the previous section are considered. The 4rst one
draws inspiration from an example in [22], while the second one involves 4ve measures and shows
an instance where DS- and equi-optimal solutions actually diFer. In both cases the algorithm was
implemented with the Mathematica programming language.
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Fig. 1. Density functions in Example 7.1.
Example 7.1. Let  = [0; 1] and let 1 be de4ned by its density function f1 w.r.t. the Lebesgue
measure .:
f1(x) =


16x if 06x ≤ 14 ;
8− 16x if 14 ¡x6 12 ;
0 otherwise:
Moreover, we obtain 2 and 3 (and f2; f3, consequently) by shifting f1 to the right by 14 and
1
2 ,
respectively (Fig. 1).
The function g1 de4ned on 1⊂R 3 by (52) attains the minimum value of 0.828427 at the point
u˜1 = (0:292893; 0:414214; 0:292893):
Clearly, we have J2 = ∅. Consequently, no further steps of the algorithm are needed and the DS-
and equi-optimal values coincide:
y∗1 = 
∗ = (0:828427; 0:828427; 0:828427):
The following allocation u is actually a partition and satis4es (13) when u˜1 replaces the whole
sequence u1; : : : ; ur of the general de4nition,
u = (IB1 ; IB2 ; IB3)
with
B1 = [0; 0:353553);
B2 = [0:353553; 0:646427);
B3 = [0:646427; 1]:
By Proposition 6.1, u is the sought DS- and equi-optimal solution. This partition is depicted in
Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2. The DS- and equi-optimal partition in Example 7.1.
Fig. 3. Density functions in Example 7.2.
In Weller [22] this example was devised in order to relate DS-optimality with Pareto optimality
and envy freeness. DS-optimality, however, is not the main topic targeted by the work and an explicit
optimal solution for this example is not available in the given reference.
Example 7.2. Let =[0; 2], and let 1; 2 be two Beta distributions with parameters (2,5) and (8,3),
respectively. Let 3 be Uniform on [0.9,1.1] and let 4; 5 be two other Beta distributions shifted
on [1,2] with parameters (2,7) and (4,2) respectively (Fig. 3).
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The function g1 now contains 5 variables and its minimization on 1 yields the following argument:
u˜1 = (0; 0; 0:248432; 0:491692; 0:259876)
with g1(u˜1)=0:847519. A special care is needed in the numerical implementation, when the minimiz-
ing solution contains null components. In fact, any numerical procedure yields approximate values.
Hence the algorithm could fail to recognize null values and it may return imprecise solutions. In
the example the 4rst two components of u˜1 were extremely close to the null value and were conse-
quently set to zero. A more precise assessment for the nonnull components in u˜1 was obtained by
considering the algorithm restricted to the measures 3; 4; 5 on F˜1 = [0:9; 2].
The algorithm then requires a second step which involves 1 and 2 (J2 = {1; 2}) on F2 = [0:0:9).
The function g2 is minimized on 2 by
u˜2 = (0:391706; 0:608294)
with g2(u˜2)=0:88148. Evidently J3=∅ and the algorithm stops here, yielding the following DS-optimal
value:
∗ = (0:88148; 0:88148; 0:847519; 0:847519; 0:847519):
The following partition DS satis4es (13) for the sequence u˜1; u˜2 and, therefore, is DS-optimal:
DS = (IB1 ; IB2 ; IB3 ; IB4 ; IB5);
with
B1 = [0; 0:490517);
B2 = [0:490517; 0:9);
B3 = [0:9; 1:0695);
B4 = [1:0695; 1:47021);
B5 = [1:47021; 2]:
The solution is illustrated in Fig. 4. Evidently, this solution is not equi-optimal. To obtain such a
solution with value
y∗ = (0:847519; 0:847519; 0:847519; 0:847519; 0:847519)
one may, for instance, consider the following partition (Fig. 5):
E = (IC1 ; IC2 ; IC3 ; IC4 ; IC5)
with
C1 = [0; 0:450187);
C2 = [0:533315; 0:9);
C3 = [0:9; 1:0695);
C4 = [1:0695; 1:47021);
C5 = [1:47021; 2] ∪ [0:450187; 0:533315):
The interval [0:450187; 0:533315) may be added to C3 or C4 as well, or may be shared among
the three, since it is given null value by all measures 3; 4 and 5.
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Fig. 4. The DS-optimal partition in Example 7.2.
Fig. 5. An equi-optimal partition in Example 7.2.
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